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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: DD/I Comments on General Krulak's Memorandum for the Special Group (CI), "Intelligence Requirements for Counterinsurgency"

1. General Krulak's memorandum probably serves a useful purpose in highlighting the problem of providing intelligence support to counterinsurgency planning. However, we have very serious misgivings about his concept of what is required and his proposal that his EEI be forwarded to the USIB as a formal requirement.

a. As presently constituted, the EEI represents a blanket request for a broad range of material, of unspecified degree of detail, to be provided on a continuing basis. These requirements would have to be greatly refined to provide realistic guidance to intelligence collection and production.

b. Despite General Krulak's impression, much of the material requested is already available in finished intelligence form -- in NIE's on countries where insurgency or instability is a problem, in research reports, and current intelligence articles, in basic intelligence publications like the NIS series and the Army-sponsored Human Relations Area File Country Handbooks. Although the counterintelligence planners

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have some requirements not specifically covered in general purpose intelligence production, they are not greatly different from the special requirements of various others in the general field of cold war operations.

c. The counterinsurgency planner's position would appear to be less comparable to that of the purely military planner than to that of the DD/P covert action officer or of planners or administrators in others fields of cold war activity -- in the State Department, AID, USIA, etc. The chief problem appears to lie not in the "unique nature" of counterinsurgency intelligence requirements but rather in the lack of developed capabilities in the counterinsurgency field for exploiting and bringing together the wide variety of available finished intelligence, for identifying and obtaining help in dealing with intelligence gaps and special requirements, for maintaining continuing surveillance of incoming reports and evaluations on the situation, and for confirming the reliability of the intelligence judgments used in draft plans.

2. We recognize that the counterinsurgency planners cannot simply be given a bibliography of published intelligence -- that they may require a good deal of support from the intelligence community. We feel, however, that the establishment of a close support intelligence capability, in or closely associated with the counterinsurgency planning element, will probably prove essential. This arrangement would greatly simplify the effective utilization of existing intelligence material and the assimilation of new reports and assessments. On this basis the community's special support operations would be comparable to that provided others involved in detailed cold war planning operations and would involve minimum duplication of services already being provided as a matter of common concern.

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3. In conclusion, we believe that General Krulak's requirements need considerable refining before the support role to be played by the intelligence community can be effectively delineated. We certainly urge that relevant DD/P experience be brought to bear. It might also be desirable, either as a preliminary step or as part of a continuing support operation, to set up an ad hoc committee of principal USIB collectors and producers to consult with General Krulak in working out requirements. In addition to the organizational questions referred to above, the principal matters to be clarified concern the level and specificity of the planning involved and the degree of detail and currency required in supporting intelligence material. Any attempt to develop and maintain highly detailed operational level coverage of even a single country can be extremely costly, as the Task Force "W" experience indicates.

4. We have not attempted a detailed analysis of the EEI themselves, which appear to provide a useful general guide to the ground to be covered. However, we are somewhat skeptical that the greatly varying insurgency situations throughout the world can be readily assessed except in a preliminary sense on the basis of a single all-purpose series of questions and are even more skeptical about the implication of the covering memorandum that this approach will provide a foolproof key to analysis. Although the Marxist approach and techniques of analysis mentioned in the covering memorandum provided some highly useful new tools and concepts in the field of the social sciences, they

have not proved infallible. Indeed, the very rigidity with which the Marxian dialectic has been applied has on many occasions led the Communists to grossly misconstrue the situation confronting them.

5. In addition, we have some question about the appended list of countries, although this may reflect uncertainty about the criteria being used. Peru, Nicaragua, Cameroun, and Mauretania are likely additional candidates for listing.